7 November 2025
Background
Criminal armed groups continue to expand their hold over Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and other regions of the country. The efforts of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the deployment of a UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) in June 2024 have been unable to slow their advance, in part since the MSS, deployed independently of the UN, has struggled to attract enough voluntary funding and deploy sufficient personnel and equipment.
Recognizing these challenges, on 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793 authorizing the establishment of a larger, more robust “Gang Suppression Force” in lieu of the MSS, and the creation of a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide more sustainable resourcing for the deployment. Many questions remain about the deployment of the new force and UN Support Office. This is therefore a critical moment to step back and learn from previous peace operations in Haiti, with the goal of giving these new operations the best chance of success possible, in addition to addressing the gaps that remain in a comprehensive approach to Haiti’s continuing political, security and governance challenges.
The UN has had a continuous presence in Haiti for the past two decades, deploying two robust multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), followed by a UN special political mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), operating alongside the MSS.
Over the past twenty years, Haiti has served as a crucible for UN peace operations: the evolution of successive missions in Haiti has both reflected and informed the development of UN peace operations thinking and practice. Robust approaches to combating gangs, as opposed to state or non-state armed forces pursuing political agendas, challenged UN peacekeeping principles, approaches and tools. Major innovations like Joint Mission Analysis Centres and community violence reduction approaches were trialled first in Haiti before being rolled out in other missions. The UN was also forced to learn more difficult lessons in Haiti: Cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, the introduction of cholera, and civilian casualties from operations in dense urban environments led the UN to develop a zero-tolerance approach to sexual exploitation, strengthened environmental policies, and more effective approaches to the protection of civilians.
Despite this international support, Haitians have not managed to agree on a sustainable political solution – elections have not been held since 2016 – or to address the root causes of violence, particularly Haiti’s political economy. The UN has struggled to encourage Haitians to overcome political deadlock, and today the situation in Haiti is worse than ever.
Aim
The session contributes to the UN’s Review on the Future of All Forms of Peace Operations, by reflecting on the history of UN peace operations in Haiti. The goal is to identify lessons relevant not only to the immediate future of Haiti, including the operations of the new Gang Suppression Force and UNSOH, but also to the future of UN peace operations more generally in this moment of profound change. It will also contribute to other upcoming discussions about responses to the situation in Haiti, including the Summit of the Americas meeting in December in the Dominican Republic, as well as discussions ahead of the expiration of the BINUH mandate on 31 January 2026.
The event
Which key issues were discussed
Reflecting on past UN peace operations in Haiti, the goal was to identify lessons relevant not only to the immediate future of Haiti, including the operations of the new Gang Suppression Force (GSF) and UNSOH, but also to the future of UN peace operations more generally. While the humanitarian situation is dire, the security front in Port-au-Prince has been quieter at present with gangs – and the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission – retrenching ahead of the GSF deployment. In the perception of Haitians, the MSS did not deliver and expectations of what the GSF – which has neither money nor troops – might accomplish are even lower. Still, the hope is that the GSF might contribute to stabilising the situation and prepare the ground for elections and a return to constitutional order. On the political side, the failure of the Haitian state remains the core of the problem. It is imperative that the Government take full responsibility for addressing the security, humanitarian and political situation. While some elements of international engagement in Haiti have yielded positive results (e.g. legal aid offices, support to police or community violence reduction programmes), they ultimately did not address core problems, such as corruption and the country’s political economy, and were not sustainable without external funding and other support.
What is being done/to do about them
Even in the best case, the GSF can only deliver preliminary security gains. For lasting improvement, tools are needed that can engage Haitian society as a whole, including supporting courageous efforts to tackle links between crime and politics. UN Police’s advisory role should be embedded in a networked multilateralism that draws on resources across the UN system and builds on valuable lessons in the areas of human rights, justice, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, and engaging youth. Efforts to address the political situation must be led by a national strategy and linked to a compact, a framework for mutual accountability, including incentive structures that encourage the Government of Haiti – as well as the gangs – to tackle political issues. While peace operations can create political space, the Security Council needs to play a more active role – not least in addressing the political economy to shift the conflict dynamics and deal with root causes.
What implications emerged for the UNSC and UN HQ
Responsibility and accountability must be shared more evenly among various international and national stakeholders in Haiti. In the coming months, it will be pivotal to empower and hold the Government accountable with a focus on elections in 2026, including clarifying concrete issues such as political party financing and re-establishing election authorities. Aligning strategies – i.e. ensuring that efforts are guided by a common vision and that BINUH and the GSF Special Representative speak with one political voice – is an important step to foster a political resolution. This also entails maintaining and expanding the sanctions regime in parallel to force deployment.
Beyond the Haitian context. non-UN missions and peace operations à la carte face challenges of sustainability, accountability, coordination and impartiality. Whether they are in fact a ‘cheaper’ or more cost-effective option, remains an open question. Instead, staying the course until sufficient progress has been achieved is essential, while recognising that the window for and trust in external engagement are finite.