Criminal armed groups continue to expand their hold over Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and other regions of the country. The efforts of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the deployment of a UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) in June 2024 have been unable to slow their advance, in part since the MSS, deployed independently of the UN, has struggled to attract enough voluntary funding and deploy sufficient personnel and equipment.
Recognizing these challenges, on 30 September 2025, the Security Council adopted resolution 2793 authorizing the establishment of a larger, more robust “Gang Suppression Force” in lieu of the MSS, and the creation of a UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) to provide more sustainable resourcing for the deployment. Many questions remain about the deployment of the new force and UN Support Office. This is therefore a critical moment to step back and learn from previous peace operations in Haiti, with the goal of giving these new operations the best chance of success possible, in addition to addressing the gaps that remain in a comprehensive approach to Haiti’s continuing political, security and governance challenges.
The UN has had a continuous presence in Haiti for the past two decades, deploying two robust multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), followed by a UN special political mission, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), operating alongside the MSS.
Over the past twenty years, Haiti has served as a crucible for UN peace operations: the evolution of successive missions in Haiti has both reflected and informed the development of UN peace operations thinking and practice. Robust approaches to combatting gangs, as opposed to state or non-state armed forces pursuing political agendas, challenged UN peacekeeping principles, approaches and tools. Major innovations like Joint Mission Analysis Centres and community violence reduction approaches were trialled first in Haiti before being rolled out in other missions. The UN was also forced to learn more difficult lessons in Haiti: Cases of sexual exploitation and abuse, the introduction of cholera, and civilian casualties from operations in dense urban environments led the UN to develop a zero-tolerance approach to sexual exploitation, strengthened environmental policies, and more effective approaches to protection of civilians.
Despite this international support, Haitians have not managed to agree on a sustainable political solution – elections have not been held since 2016 – or to address the root causes of violence, particularly Haiti’s political economy. The UN has struggled to encourage Haitians to overcome political deadlock, and today the situation in Haiti is worse than ever.
Aim
The session contributes to the UN’s Review on the Future of All Forms of Peace Operations, by reflecting on the history of UN peace operations in Haiti. The goal is to identify lessons relevant not only to the immediate future of Haiti, including the operations of the new Gang Suppression Force and UNSOH, but also to the future of UN peace operations more generally in this moment of profound change. It will also contribute to other upcoming discussions about responses to the situation in Haiti, including the Summit of the Americas meeting in December in the Dominican Republic, as well as discussions ahead of the expiration of the BINUH mandate on 31 January 2026.
Agenda
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Please direct any questions you may have to Annika Hansen (an.hansen@zif-berlin.org).
